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A disinformation campaign involving a deepfake video of Ukrainian commander Andrii Biletskyi was circulated on Russian Telegram channels in June 2025. The video used AI-generated audio to falsely claim that Ukrainian authorities were intentionally failing to identify fallen soldiers to avoid paying compensation. The content was debunked as a manipulation tactic, with Hive Moderation confirming the audio was 99% AI-generated.
In late June 2025, Russian Telegram channels reportedly circulated a video containing a purportedly AI-generated audio track impersonating Ukrainian commander Andrii Biletskyi. The audio clip reportedly claimed Ukrainian authorities deliberately avoid identifying fallen soldiers to withhold compensation. Verification reportedly showed the voice was synthetic and mismatched with original May 16 footage of Biletskyi. Hive Moderation reportedly confirmed the audio was overwhelmingly AI-generated.
Domain classification, causal taxonomy, severity scores, and national security assessments were LLM-classified and may contain errors.
Using AI systems to conduct large-scale disinformation campaigns, malicious surveillance, or targeted and sophisticated automated censorship and propaganda, with the aim of manipulating political processes, public opinion, and behavior.
Also classified as
The AI system was used to generate highly realistic but entirely fabricated audio of a military commander making false claims.
The incident involves a coordinated disinformation campaign on Russian Telegram channels using deepfake technology to manipulate public opinion and undermine trust in the Ukrainian government during an active conflict.
Human
Due to a decision or action made by humans
Intentional
Due to an expected outcome from pursuing a goal
Post-deployment
Occurring after the AI model has been trained and deployed
The risk was caused by human actors intentionally deploying and using AI voice generation technology to create and spread a political disinformation video.
Added categories peak at 3: Substantial (Epistemic Harm, Inferred)
A disinformation campaign utilized AI-generated audio to falsely depict Ukrainian commander Andrii Biletskyi claiming the government was neglecting fallen soldiers. While quickly debunked by AI detection tools, the incident highlights the ongoing exploitation of AI voice-cloning technology by foreign adversaries to conduct information warfare and undermine public trust during active conflicts.
The AI voice generator was used as a tool to perform a specific, well-defined function of generating synthetic audio mimicking a specific voice based on direct inputs.
Risk Level 3. Limited Risk: The report describes AI-generated content (a deepfake video), which falls under transparency obligations for synthetic media under the EU AI Act.
The core of the incident involves the creation of synthetic audio mimicking a commander's voice, which is Voice Generation, while Hive Moderation was used for Content Verification.
The report clearly details the nature of the deepfake, the specific claims made, the target of the impersonation, and the verification method (Hive Moderation) used to debunk it.
None
Technology
AI Voice Cloning Technology
Generative AI allowed highly realistic cloning of the commander's voice.
AI Video Editing Tools
AI tools allowed seamless integration of synthetic audio with real footage.
Data Inputs
Publicly Available Footage
The original video from May 16 was accessible online for manipulation.
Voice Training Data
Public audio of the commander enabled training of the voice clone.
Human Factors
Target Audience Susceptibility
Viewer emotions are easily exploited by sensitive topics like fallen soldiers.
Malicious Intent of Actors
State-sponsored actors actively sought to spread destabilizing propaganda.
Process and Methods
Unmoderated Distribution Channels
Telegram channels allowed rapid, unchecked spread of the deepfake video.
Reactive Fact-Checking
Debunking occurred only after the video had already widely circulated.
Management
Inadequate Content Moderation
Platform management failed to establish proactive deepfake filtering.
Lack of Incident Response
No rapid response protocols to mitigate viral state-sponsored disinformation.
Regulatory Environment
Lack of Deepfake Regulations
No international legal frameworks exist to deter state-backed deepfakes.
Weak Platform Accountability
No regulatory pressure on messaging apps to instantly remove fake media.
AI system involved
Identified by automated extraction; can differ from the alleged developers above.
