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In the lead-up to the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election, deepfake videos were used in influence operations to impersonate political figures, including candidate Lai Ching-te and President Tsai Ing-wen. These videos, which were debunked by fact-checking organizations, were part of broader disinformation campaigns aimed at manipulating public opinion and undermining trust in the government. The incidents highlight the use of AI-generated synthetic media as a tool for cognitive warfare and election interference.
In the lead-up to Taiwan's presidential election in January 2024, a deepfake video circulated showing candidate Lai Ching-te endorsing his rivals. Taiwanese intelligence issued warnings of intensified Chinese disinformation campaigns, such as Spamouflage, aimed at manipulating the election outcome.
Domain classification, causal taxonomy, severity scores, and national security assessments were LLM-classified and may contain errors.
Using AI systems to conduct large-scale disinformation campaigns, malicious surveillance, or targeted and sophisticated automated censorship and propaganda, with the aim of manipulating political processes, public opinion, and behavior.
Also classified as
The AI system was used to generate specific false videos of political figures to mislead the public.
The incident involves the coordinated use of AI-generated deepfakes to conduct a large-scale disinformation campaign aimed at manipulating political processes and public opinion in Taiwan.
Human
Due to a decision or action made by humans
Intentional
Due to an expected outcome from pursuing a goal
Post-deployment
Occurring after the AI model has been trained and deployed
The deepfakes were intentionally created and distributed by human actors to influence the Taiwanese election using post-deployment AI generation tools.
Added categories peak at 4: Severe (Epistemic Harm, Indirect)
AI-generated deepfakes of key political figures were deployed in a coordinated, state-sponsored cognitive warfare campaign targeting the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election. While the immediate impact was mitigated by robust local fact-checking networks, the incident highlights the substantial and evolving threat that AI-driven information operations pose to democratic sovereignty and electoral integrity.
The AI systems (deep learning models) were used as tools by human operators to generate specific synthetic video and audio outputs based on direct inputs, without exhibiting independent agency or autonomous decision-making.
Limited Risk: The report describes the creation and dissemination of 'AI-generated content such as deepfakes', which falls under Limited Risk due to transparency and disclosure obligations.
The AI systems were used specifically to generate highly realistic synthetic videos of political figures to be shared on social media platforms.
The reports provide clear, detailed accounts of the deepfakes used in the Taiwanese election, backed by statements from intelligence authorities, fact-checking organizations, and political figures. The role of AI is explicitly identified as deep learning used to create realistic hoaxes.
The deepfakes could be viewed as isolated cyber-pranks or financial scams (in the case of the crypto video) rather than a coordinated state-sponsored cognitive warfare campaign, though the evidence strongly points to the latter.
Technology
Deep Learning for Deepfakes
Deep learning models allow creation of highly realistic video and voice hoaxes.
Voice Cloning Technology
Realistic voice synthesis mimics political figures to deliver false messages.
Data Inputs
Authentic Video/Audio Footage
Real media of candidates is manipulated to generate deceptive deepfakes.
Language and Cultural Indicators
Use of simplified characters and terms reveals foreign origin of data inputs.
Human Factors
Susceptibility to Cognitive Warfare
Public vulnerability to emotional themes like war, food safety, and fear.
Socio-Political Polarization
Existing societal divisions make people more likely to share biased deepfakes.
Process and Methods
Algorithmic Amplification
Social media platforms rapidly amplify sensationalist deepfake content.
Infiltration of Trusted Groups
Actors build trust in non-political groups before introducing disinformation.
Management
State-Sponsored Influence Operations
Foreign ministries coordinate systematic cognitive warfare campaigns.
Insufficient Platform Moderation
Social media management fails to proactively block deepfake distribution.
Regulatory Environment
Lack of Deepfake Regulation
Absence of strict global regulations on generating and sharing synthetic media.
Geopolitical Gray-Zone Tactics
State actors exploit regulatory gaps in international cyber laws to interfere.
AI system involved
An AI system was involved, but the reports do not identify it.
Identified by automated extraction; can differ from the alleged developers above.
