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During the lead-up to the February 2024 Indonesian elections, multiple political parties utilized AI-generated content to influence voters. This included a deepfake of the deceased dictator Suharto, AI-generated children in political advertisements to circumvent campaign regulations, and an audio deepfake targeting a presidential candidate. These incidents highlight the use of synthetic media to manipulate public opinion and the challenges of regulating AI in political campaigning.
An AI-generated deepfake of Suharto, the deceased Indonesian dictator, was generated and circulated by the Golkar Party ahead of the February 2024 Indonesian elections. This video, which aimed to influence voter perceptions by invoking Suharto's legacy, sought to manipulate public opinion and misused deceased individuals' likenesses for political gain. The incident is another example of political deepfakes creating convincing misinformation.
Domain classification, causal taxonomy, severity scores, and national security assessments were LLM-classified and may contain errors.
Using AI systems to conduct large-scale disinformation campaigns, malicious surveillance, or targeted and sophisticated automated censorship and propaganda, with the aim of manipulating political processes, public opinion, and behavior.
Also classified as
The campaigns generated and spread highly convincing false audio and video representations of political figures to mislead the electorate.
Candidate Anies Baswedan was targeted with a fabricated audio deepfake designed to manipulate public perception of his political standing.
The incident involves coordinated, large-scale political campaigns using AI-generated deepfakes and synthetic media to influence public opinion and manipulate voters during a national election.
Human
Due to a decision or action made by humans
Intentional
Due to an expected outcome from pursuing a goal
Post-deployment
Occurring after the AI model has been trained and deployed
The risk was caused by human political campaigns intentionally deploying AI-generated deepfakes and synthetic media post-deployment to manipulate public opinion and influence voters.
Added categories peak at 4: Severe (Epistemic Harm, Indirect)
Multiple Indonesian political parties deployed AI-generated deepfakes and synthetic media, including a deepfake of deceased dictator Suharto and fabricated candidate audio, to influence voters and bypass campaign regulations during the 2024 election. This represents a substantial information warfare and sovereignty concern, highlighting the evolving threat of AI-driven election manipulation.
The AI systems were used as tools by human political campaigns to generate specific synthetic media, such as cloning Suharto's face and voice, creating animated avatars, and generating synthetic children for advertisements, operating on direct inputs to produce specific outputs.
Risk Level 3: Limited Risk. The report describes the use of 'AI-generated content such as deepfakes' and 'interactive AI chatbots' which require transparency obligations under the Act so that users are aware they are interacting with AI.
The primary AI systems highlighted in the incident were used to generate deepfake videos (cloning Suharto's face) and clone voices (Suharto and Anies Baswedan) for political campaigning.
The report provides clear, detailed accounts of multiple specific AI deployments in the Indonesian election, including the platforms used, view counts, and statements from political parties, candidates, and watchdog groups. There is minimal ambiguity regarding the events, and the classifications are well-supported by the text.
None
Technology
AI Face and Voice Cloning Tools
Advanced AI tools easily cloned Suharto's face and voice to create deepfakes.
Generative AI Image Software
Software used to create fake images of children to bypass campaign rules.
Data Inputs
Historical Audio and Video Footage
Abundant archival data of Suharto enabled highly realistic voice cloning.
Unlabeled AI Generated Content
Lack of metadata or watermarks allowed deepfakes to pass as real footage.
Human Factors
High Social Media Consumption
Indonesians' high internet usage facilitated rapid viral spread of deepfakes.
Voter Susceptibility to Manipulation
Voters easily misled by realistic AI representations of political figures.
Process and Methods
Bypassing Ad Campaign Rules
Parties used AI children to circumvent bans on children in political ads.
Rapid Social Media Distribution
Algorithms prioritized viral deepfake content, spreading it to millions.
Management
Prioritizing Outreach Over Ethics
Political parties prioritized voter engagement over ethical AI considerations.
Lack of Campaign Accountability
Campaign teams deployed AI without internal ethical review or risk assessment.
Regulatory Environment
Lack of Deepfake Regulations
No specific laws or enforcement mechanisms existed to restrict political AI.
Slow Government Response
Ministry advisories were insufficient to curb the viral spread of deepfakes.
AI system involved
Identified by automated extraction; can differ from the alleged developers above.
