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A deepfake video featuring a U.S. State Department official was circulated on Telegram and Russian media to falsely claim that the U.S. supported strikes on the Russian city of Belgorod. The video, which used manipulated footage and audio, was used as a tool for disinformation to incite tensions and manipulate public opinion regarding the war in Ukraine. U.S. officials condemned the video as a deliberate attempt by the Kremlin to spread disinformation.
A deepfake video of State Department spokesman Matthew Miller falsely suggested Belgorod was a legitimate target for Ukrainian strikes. This disinformation spread on Telegram and Russian media, misleading the public and inciting tensions. U.S. officials condemned the deepfake. This incident is an example of the threat of AI-powered disinformation and hybrid attacks.
Domain classification, causal taxonomy, severity scores, and national security assessments were LLM-classified and may contain errors.
Using AI systems to conduct large-scale disinformation campaigns, malicious surveillance, or targeted and sophisticated automated censorship and propaganda, with the aim of manipulating political processes, public opinion, and behavior.
Also classified as
The AI-generated video fabricated false claims about U.S. foreign policy and the evacuation status of Belgorod, misleading viewers.
The deepfake video was used as part of a coordinated disinformation campaign aimed at manipulating public opinion and political discourse surrounding the war in Ukraine.
Human
Due to a decision or action made by humans
Intentional
Due to an expected outcome from pursuing a goal
Post-deployment
Occurring after the AI model has been trained and deployed
The incident was caused by human actors who intentionally created and distributed a deepfake video post-deployment of generative AI technology to spread political disinformation.
Added categories peak at 4: Severe (Epistemic Harm, Indirect)
A state-sponsored deepfake video impersonating a U.S. State Department official was disseminated by Russian state media to falsely claim U.S. support for strikes on Russian territory. The incident represents a substantial information warfare threat, highlighting the evolving use of generative AI to fabricate official diplomatic communications and manipulate public opinion during active geopolitical conflicts.
The AI system was used as a tool to perform a specific function, namely generating a deepfake video by manipulating existing footage and audio of a spokesperson. The report describes the video as being 'powered by artificial intelligence' to achieve a specific, human-directed disinformation goal.
Risk Level 3. Limited Risk: The report describes an AI-generated deepfake video. Under the EU AI Act, AI systems that generate or manipulate image, audio or video content (deepfakes) pose a moderate risk and are subject to transparency obligations to ensure users are informed.
The AI system was used to manipulate actual footage of a spokesperson, altering their lip movements and voice to make them appear to say fabricated statements.
The report clearly details the creation, content, and dissemination of the deepfake video, as well as the reactions of both U.S. and Russian officials. The role of AI in generating the deepfake is explicitly stated, and the political context is well-documented.
None. The incident is unambiguously a deepfake-based disinformation campaign.
While the specific AI model used is unknown, this does not prevent clear classification under the taxonomies.
Technology
AI Deepfake Generation Tools
Advanced AI allowed creating realistic fabricated video from actual footage.
Imperfect Visual Synthesis
Lip sync was off and tie changed color midway, showing technical flaws.
Data Inputs
Use of Authentic Source Footage
Actual footage of State Dept spokesman was used to seed the deepfake.
Human Factors
Audience Susceptibility
Belgorod residents and officials believed the fake due to high tension.
Intentional Malicious Creation
Actors intentionally fabricated remarks to manipulate public opinion.
Process and Methods
Social Media Distribution Networks
Telegram and VK allowed rapid dissemination of unverified deepfake video.
Lack of Immediate Fact-Checking
Russian media outlets shared the video without verifying its authenticity.
Management
Kremlin Disinformation Strategy
Management of state propaganda used fakes as a core strategy.
Lack of Platform Moderation
VK and Telegram management failed to flag or remove the deepfake.
Regulatory Environment
Lack of Deepfake Regulations
Absence of international laws banning or labeling state-backed deepfakes.
State-Controlled Media Ecosystem
Russian state bodies and media amplified the fake without regulatory check.
AI system involved
An AI system was involved, but the reports do not identify it.
Identified by automated extraction; can differ from the alleged developers above.
