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Multiple state-sponsored threat actors, primarily from Iran and Russia, have integrated generative AI tools into their cyber-enabled influence operations targeting the 2024 U.S. elections and other geopolitical targets. These actors utilized AI for text generation, voice cloning, and image manipulation to create fake news websites and deceptive social media content. While these efforts were identified and largely mitigated by government and private sector monitoring, they represent a persistent threat to democratic integrity and public trust.
The Iranian state-sponsored group Cotton Sandstorm, linked to the IRGC, has integrated generative AI into cyber influence operations. In December 2023, it launched Operation “For Humanity," using AI-crafted messaging to hijack a U.S.-based IPTV streaming service with propaganda about the Israel-Hamas conflict. The group also engages in election-related reconnaissance, which suggests they used AI-enhanced influence efforts ahead of the 2024 U.S. election.
Domain classification, causal taxonomy, severity scores, and national security assessments were LLM-classified and may contain errors.
Using AI systems to conduct large-scale disinformation campaigns, malicious surveillance, or targeted and sophisticated automated censorship and propaganda, with the aim of manipulating political processes, public opinion, and behavior.
Also classified as
The campaigns involved generating and spreading highly deceptive deepfakes and false allegations of sexual assault to denigrate political candidates.
The creation of hundreds of fake news websites and automated social media comments polluted the online information ecosystem.
The incident involves state-sponsored actors using AI systems to conduct coordinated, large-scale disinformation campaigns aimed at manipulating public opinion and political processes.
Human
Due to a decision or action made by humans
Intentional
Due to an expected outcome from pursuing a goal
Post-deployment
Occurring after the AI model has been trained and deployed
The risk was caused by the intentional decisions and actions of human threat actors who deployed already-existing AI models to conduct disinformation campaigns.
Added categories peak at 4: Severe (Epistemic Harm, Inferred)
State-sponsored actors from Russia, Iran, and China leveraged generative AI to scale disinformation and influence operations targeting the 2024 U.S. election and geopolitical targets. While the operations were successfully mitigated and had limited persuasive impact, they highlight an evolved threat to information security, democratic sovereignty, and societal stability.
The report describes threat actors using commercial AI tools to assist in content creation. For example, CopyCop created fake websites 'with the help of commercial artificial intelligence (AI) tools such as ChatGPT and DALL-E 3' and used generative AI to rewrite content. This represents an 'Assistant' behavior where the AI augments human capabilities but requires human direction and oversight to execute the campaign.
Limited Risk: The report describes the use of generative AI to create deepfakes of political figures (e.g., 'AI-enhanced deepfake videos about Vice President Kamala Harris') and generate text/images, which fall under the transparency obligations of Limited Risk systems.
The AI systems were primarily used to generate social media posts, comments, and articles to populate fake news websites, alongside generating deepfake videos of political candidates.
Multiple independent sources, including Microsoft, the FBI, DOJ, CISA, and Recorded Future, provide highly detailed, consistent, and corroborated accounts of the threat actors' activities and their use of AI. The role of AI is explicitly detailed across multiple reports, leaving little ambiguity about the nature of the operations.
The operations could be viewed primarily as traditional cyber espionage and phishing campaigns, with AI playing only a minor, secondary role in content generation.
Technology
AI Voice Cloning Tools
Used to clone the FBI director's voice to fabricate voter fraud claims.
Generative AI Text Models
ChatGPT used to rewrite plagiarized articles and generate fake comments.
AI Deepfake Video Generators
Created manipulated videos of political candidates to damage reputations.
Data Inputs
Plagiarized Media Content
Generative AI used stolen news articles as input to rewrite propaganda.
Leaked Personal Datasets
Ancestry and leaked data used to target specific military personnel.
Open-Source Information Harvesting
Adversaries scraped LinkedIn and ancestry sites to identify target personnel.
Human Factors
Targeted Phishing Susceptibility
Campaign staff fell victim to spear-phishing, leaking campaign data.
Audience Trust in Audio Visuals
Voters easily believe realistic AI-cloned voices and deepfake videos.
Process and Methods
Automated Content Generation
AI tools enabled rapid scaling of low-quality propaganda across platforms.
Inauthentic Account Automation
Automation scripts deployed fake accounts to amplify AI-generated content.
Typosquatting and Redirects
Redirect techniques bypassed platform moderators to show fake AI news.
Management
State-Sponsored Funding of IOs
Adversary governments financed front companies to run AI campaigns.
Use of Front Companies
Emennet Pasargad used ASA as a cover to access commercial AI tools.
Regulatory Environment
Lax Identity Verification
Hosting providers allowed anonymous purchase of server space by adversaries.
Inadequate Platform Moderation
Social media platforms struggled to proactively block AI-generated fakes.
AI system involved
Identified by automated extraction; can differ from the alleged developers above.
